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I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews Texas family law cases from federal and Texas
courts during the Survey period from December 1, 2016 through Novem-
ber 30, 2017. The article excludes cases involving the Texas Department
of Family and Protective Services, the Texas Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral and county Domestic Relations Offices. The volume of Texas family
matter case law increases most years and exceeds the authors’ ability to
report on them.1 Accordingly, the authors have limited review to a few
highlight cases and an examination of trends of the past year.
II. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND PARENTAGE
A. PAVAN V. SMITH
On the second anniversary of the Obergefell v. Hodges decision, the
U.S. Supreme Court reversed an Arkansas Supreme Court ruling that
denied married same-sex couples the right to both be listed on a child’s
birth certificate. Pavan v. Smith challenged an Arkansas statute under the
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process for
married same-sex couples.2 The Arkansas trial court ruled that Arkansas
Code Section 20-18-401 violated federal constitutional law, but the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court reversed. In a per curiam decision, the U.S. Su-
preme Court found that same-sex couples should be afforded the “same
terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples” to civil marriage.3 The
Obergefell decision expressly identified a parent’s appearance on a child’s
birth certificate as a benefit of marriage, a point the Pavan opinion as-
serts was no accident.4 The Court explained that the Arkansas statutes
prescribing who is listed on a birth certificate confer legal recognition on
the parents, recognition that is necessary to carry out basic parenting re-
sponsibilities like enrolling a child in school.5 Same-sex parents who are
not listed on the birth certificate do not receive that recognition, and such
disparate treatment is prohibited under Obergefell because it denies
same-sex couples the “constellation of benefits that the Stat[e] ha[s]
linked to marriage.”6 The case was reversed and remanded since Arkan-
1. Office of the Court Admin., Annual Statistical Report for the Texas Judiciary 6–9
(2016).
2. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017). The two Arkansas statutes examined in the
opinion are Arkansas Code Section 20-18-401 (West 2018) that provides that a child’s
mother be listed on a birth certificate, along with the mother’s husband, unless someone
else’s paternity has been established by a court, and Arkansas Code Section 9-10-201 (West
2018) that provides that a child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemina-
tion shall be deemed the legitimate natural child of the woman and the woman’s husband if
the husband consents in writing to the artificial insemination. The petitioners only chal-
lenged Arkansas Code Section 20-18-401 in their pleadings.
3. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078 (slip op. at 1) (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2605 (2015)).
4. Id. (citing Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
5. Id. at 2078.
6. Id. (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601).
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sas Code Section 20-18-401 was determined to be unconstitutional.7 The
Pavan decision reaffirmed protection of the rights of married same-sex
couples established by Obergefell, and may be viewed as expanding those
rights by expressly recognizing parentage as a protected right of same-sex
spouses. The Court’s issuance of a per curiam decision without briefing
and oral arguments suggests that a majority of the Justices considered the
issue settled by Obergefell.8
B. IN RE RYAN
The Tyler Court of Appeals addressed conservatorship of married
same-sex parents who were not parties to the formal adoption of their
child in the mandamus case In re Ryan.9 Mary and Lorna married in Con-
necticut in 2009. In March 2013, T.E.R. was born and placed with Mary
and Lorna. Although Mary and Lorna both acted as parents to T.E.R.,
the Texas statutes in effect at the time of the January 2014 adoption pro-
hibited both spouses of a same-sex union from being named as adoptive
parents, and only Lorna was adjudicated as T.E.R.’s parent in the formal
adoption proceeding. Then, in 2015, Obergefell granted full faith and
credit retroactively to the Connecticut marriage by Texas. Mary filed for
divorce in 2016. In her petition, she requested that she and Lorna be ap-
pointed joint managing conservators of T.E.R. Lorna filed a counter-peti-
tion and sought sole managing conservatorship. After a temporary orders
hearing, the trial court appointed Lorna sole managing conservator and
did not appoint Mary a conservator. Mary’s motion to reconsider the
temporary orders was denied, and she sought mandamus relief. The court
of appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the
parental presumption to determine conservatorship for Mary, when the
correct standard is best interest of the child.10 Under Texas Family Code
Section 153.131(a), the parental presumption is the appropriate standard
for determining managing conservator, but a possessory conservator may
be named if it is in the child’s best interest.11 A party requesting conser-
vatorship need not overcome the parental presumption for possessory
7. Id. at 2079. The Arkansas Supreme Court, as directed by the U.S. Supreme Court,
held in Pavan v. Smith that Arkansas Code Section 20-18-401 was unconstitutional, and
directed the lower court to provide declaratory and injunctive relief to extend the benefits
of the statute to same-sex parents but cautioned the lower court not to rewrite the statute.
Smith v. Pavan, 2017 Ark. 284, at *4 (2017).
8. The ruling was 6–3, with Chief Justice Roberts joining the five justices in the ma-
jority in Obergefell, and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch in dissent. Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent argues that a summary reversal is not warranted in this case. Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at
2079. His opinion is a technical one questioning the power of the Court to expand statutes
or review issues not before the Court. Gorsuch adopts the Arkansas Supreme Court’s ar-
guably stilted analysis of Arkansas Code Section 20-18-401 as a statute about biological
paternity, and never expresses a view of Obergefell. Id. So, it remains to be seen whether
this dissent signals judicial rigidity and/or possible opposition to Obergefell and its reach.
9. No. 12-16-00284, 2016 WL 6996639, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 30 2016, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.).
10. Id. at *2.
11. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.002 (West 2017).
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conservatorship. Since Mary may be appointed possessory conservator if
it is in the best interest of the child, the court conditionally granted
Mary’s writ and directed the trial court to vacate the temporary orders
and issue an order in compliance with their opinion.12 While the court of
appeals reached an equitable result by providing Mary the opportunity to
be named a possessory conservator, Mary did not receive the full benefit
a fit parent should receive. Under these facts, opposite-sex spouses would
have the opportunity to be adjudicated as adoptive parents and, in turn,
be named joint managing conservators. Mary should have the opportu-
nity to receive the full rights and duties afforded a joint managing conser-
vator. Until the full reach of Obergefell is codified or adjudicated, courts
will continue to struggle with the application of pre-Obergefell Texas law
to post-Obergefell cases. This decision was delivered in November 2016,
seven months before the Pavan decision. The court’s decision in Ryan
should be applauded as a creative effort to apply the current statutes and
remedy an inequitable trial court decision, but would a different result
have been reached if the case was a post-Pavan one?
C. IN RE A.E.
Another pre-Pavan court of appeals case, In re A.E., held that a non-
genetic mother, C.W., did not have standing to bring a suit affecting par-
ent child relationship (SAPCR) as to the child of the marriage born to
her wife.13 C.W. argued that as spouse of biological mother, M.N., she
was a legal parent of the child, and failure to recognize her as such was
prohibited under Obergefell. C.W. urged the court to construe the term
“man” or “father” in the statutes as also applying to her as a spouse pur-
suant to Obergefell. She did not, however, argue the constitutionality of
the family code paternity statutes, which have not been amended to in-
corporate same-sex spouses since Obergefell.14 The biological mother suc-
cessfully argued that C.W. is not a parent under the Texas Family Code,
and that while providing the right to marry, Obergefell did not give her
standing to maintain a SAPCR.15 The underlying issue is whether the
right to marry gives rise to a right of parentage and the other rights that
would be afforded to an opposite sex couple.16 Pavan strengthens the
12. Id.
13. In re A.E., No. 09-16-00019-CV, 2017 WL 1535101, at *10 (Tex. App—Beaumont
Apr. 27, 2017, pet. filed) (mem. op.).
14. See id. at *3.
15. Id.
16. Texas is one of several states to consider parentage issues under Obergefell. The
Arizona Supreme Court relies on Pavan in their McLaughlin opinion recognizing parent-
age rights of same-sex couples. McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017). The Mc-
Laughlin dissent agrees with the result, but questions the wisdom of rewriting the paternity
statute. Id. at 503. Petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court has been filed
in McLaughlin. State legislatures need to expedite their review of family law statutes to
address the changing definition of parent or parentage cases will increasingly end up in
federal court. See Indiana’s Henderson v. Adams, which has reached the 7th Circuit Court
of Appeals after the U.S. District Court found Indiana birth statutes unconstitutional for
failure to recognize a same-sex spouse as a legal parent who should be listed on a birth
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argument that it does, but to invoke Pavan, it may be necessary to raise a
constitutional challenge to the applicable state statutes. As noted in the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s opinion after remand, courts want to avoid
the appearance of legislating from the bench when construing statutes,
and prefer that the legislature rewrite the statutes to conform to
Obergefell’s requirements.17 Until the statutes are rewritten or declared
unconstitutional, decisions like In re A.E. will continue to cause what
some would say are inequitable results.
D. PIGEON V. TURNER
The Texas Supreme Court deferred determining the scope of
Obergefell protections when it remanded Pidgeon v. Turner to the Harris
County 310th District Court. The supreme court reasoned that the parties
should be given the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue of
whether governmental agencies are permitted, or indeed constitutionally
compelled, to offer tax-funded benefits to same-sex spouses of govern-
ment employees in light of Obergefell.18 Houston taxpayers brought an
action against the city, and Mayor Turner requested injunctive relief
prohibiting the city from providing tax-funded benefits to partners of
married same-sex employees. The trial court initially issued a temporary
injunction prohibiting the city from offering the benefits and the city filed
an interlocutory appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that states are prohibited from “exclude[ing] same-sex
couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as oppo-
site-sex couples.”19 The city then filed a supplemental brief asserting that
Obergefell required the court of appeals to reverse the injunction.
Pidgeon countered that while Obergefell compels the state to recognize
same-sex marriages, it does not permit federal courts to “commandeer
state spending decisions” or mandate extension of tax-funded state bene-
fits to same-sex spouses.20 The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals re-
versed the temporary injunction and remanded to the trial court, and
Pidgeon filed a successful petition for supreme court review. The supreme
court reversed the court of appeals decision, vacated the trial court deci-
sion, and remanded to allow the parties to fully develop and litigate their
positions. It is significant that the supreme court initially declined to hear
the case, but was moved to reopen the case after an amicus brief support-
certificate. Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (S.D. In. 2016). Indiana statutes
provide for legal parentage for biological and adopted parents, but do not confer parentage
based on a marital relationship with a legal parent. Id. at 1067–68. A Utah federal district
court recognized the right of same-sex mothers to be listed on a child’s birth certificate.
Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-CV-00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734 (D. Utah July 22, 2015).
17. Arkansas Supreme Court, as directed by the U.S. Supreme Court, held in Smith v.
Pavan that Arkansas Code Section 20-18-201 was unconstitutional and directed the lower
court to provide declaratory and injunctive relief to extend the benefits of the statute to
same-sex parents but cautioned the lower court not to rewrite the statute.
18. Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73, 87–89 (Tex. 2017).
19. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015).
20. Pidgeon, 538 S.W.3d at 89.
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ing review was filed by Governor Greg Abbott, Lieutenant Governor
Dan Patrick, and Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton. The supreme
court’s issuance of their decision on interlocutory appeal, rather than re-
viewing the case on the merits, may be viewed as a move to avoid U.S.
Supreme Court review. Whether the decision opens up the need to liti-
gate any right claimed as a benefit of same-sex marriage or, perhaps leads
to a ruling that the Texas Defense of Marriage Act is unconstitutional,
remains to be seen.21
III. MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. LOYA V. LOYA
Justice Lehrmann’s opinion in Loya v. Loya holds that, “[l]ike any con-
tract, the express terms of a mediated settlement agreement control.”22
Her opinion follows her previous ruling regarding strict adherence to the
terms of mediated settlement agreements (MSAs).23 Leticia and Miguel
Loya signed an MSA on June 13, 2010. The agreement provided for parti-
tion of future income, stating “[a]ll future earnings from each party are
partitioned to the person providing the services giving rise to the earn-
ings.”24 The agreement also required the parties to attend binding arbi-
tration if drafting or interpretation issues arose. Less than two weeks
after execution of the MSA, disagreements over the interpretation of the
future earnings provision arose, and the parties went to arbitration. At
arbitration, the wife argued that the future earnings provision applied to
earnings from services on or after June 13, 2010, the day the mediation
settlement agreement was signed, while the husband’s position was that it
applied to all future earnings, period. The arbitrator verbally ruled that
the future earnings provision should track the MSA language, and fol-
lowed the ruling with an email directing the parties to include the follow-
ing provision in the agreement incident to divorce: “All future income
and earnings are partitioned as of June 13, 2010.”25 Leticia immediately
moved to set aside the MSA, arguing the parties failed to reach mutual
assent in the agreement as evidenced by the dispute over the future earn-
ings. The trial court denied the motion and entered the final decree.
Leticia did not appeal. After Miguel received his 2011 bonus, Leticia filed
a petition for post-divorce division of property, asking for division of the
2011 community property bonus. Miguel filed for summary judgment,
which the trial court granted. Leticia appealed.
21. See Act of 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 7, § 1 (amending TEX. FAM. CODE § 1.01).
22. Loya v. Loya, 526 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Tex. 2017).
23. In re Lee held that a trial court cannot use the best interest of the child determina-
tion to deny a motion for entry of a judgment on a MSA that meets the statutory require-
ments of Texas Family Code Section 153.0071(d), except in cases involving family violence.
In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Tex. 2013).
24. Loya, 526 S.W.3d at 449.
25. Id. at 450; see Loya v. Loya, 473 S.W.3d 362, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, pet. granted), rev’d, Loya v. Loya, 526 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. 2017) (detailed discussion of
the arbitrator’s ruling).
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The case was reversed and remanded after the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals concluded, first, that the bonus was not partitioned in
the decree, second, that Leticia raised a fact question as to characteriza-
tion of the bonus, and, finally, that the bonus should be characterized as
community property.26 Chief Justice Frost dissented, finding that whether
the bonus was or was not community property was irrelevant, because
under the “unambiguous language of the agreement” it was partitioned
as future earnings, and the trial court properly entered a take-nothing
judgment on Leticia’s petition for post-divorce division of property.27
The Texas Supreme Court granted Miguel’s petition for review and
held, as Chief Justice Frost had, that the terms of the mediated settlement
control so they need not reach the issue of characterization.28 This case is
a cautionary tale of the need for precision in drafting MSAs, particularly
for division of complex estates. Miguel prevailed because the agreement
expressly stated future earnings from the date of the agreement forward,
so earnings attributable to a time period before the date of mediation, but
received after the agreement was signed, were partitioned to him.
B. IN RE C.C.E.
Three Texas courts of appeals addressed issues of timing and content of
MSAs this year. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that an
MSA that is “subject to the court’s approval,” does not leave the door
opened for a party to withdraw their consent prior to entry of an order,
and affirmed the trial court’s entry of an agreed order based on the
MSA.29
C. S.P. V. N.P.
In re S.P. v. N.P. concerned application of arbitration provisions of a
MSA when post agreement issues arise. S.P. and N.P. signed a MSA in
December of 2015.30 The appellant, S.P., raised questions about the terms
of the MSA at a hearing in March, and the trial judge directed the parties
to pursue arbitration. In April, Appellee filed a motion to enter order
and set a hearing in May. Two days before the hearing, Appellant sent
correspondence to the arbitrator setting out his disputed issues and re-
26. Loya, 526 S.W.3d at 450–51.
27. Loya v. Loya, 473 S.W.3d 362, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, rev’d,
526 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. 2017).
28. Loya, 526 S.W.3d at 451. Miguel proved that the 2011 bonus was discretionary and
argued he did not earn the bonus until the employer awarded it in March 2011. Leticia
countered with well-settled case law that the portion of a bonus that is compensation for
work done during the marriage is community property. Justice Lehrmann does not address
characterization of the bonus, stating “[w]hether the portion of the purely discretionary
bonus based on services performed during the marriage constitutes community property is
an important issue, but one we need not reach in this case.” Id. Perhaps this opinion opens
the door to raising characterization issues of discretionary bonuses in future litigation.
29. In re C.C.E., 530 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
30. S.P. III v. N.P., No. 02-16-00278-CV, 2017 WL 3821887 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
Aug. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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quested that the trial court refer the matter to arbitration. Nothing else in
the court record evidenced Appellant pursuing arbitration as directed by
the judge. After the May hearing, the trial judge entered the Appellee’s
proposed order, and S.P. appealed. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals
held it was reversible error for the trial court to enter an order based on a
MSA that contained an arbitration clause when disputed issues re-
mained.31 This case highlights that an arbitration provision in a MSA is
mandatory, so practitioners who do not want to arbitrate should strike
the arbitration provision from the MSA. Further, if the opposing party
raises disputed issues to the court after a MSA with an arbitration clause
is signed, but fails to schedule arbitration, the best practice may be to
schedule the arbitration yourself.32
D. HIGHSMITH V. HIGHSMITH
The Amarillo Court of Appeals ruled that a document purporting to be
a MSA that is signed before a divorce petition is filed fails to meet the
threshold requirements of Texas Family Code Section 6.602(a).33 Accord-
ingly, parties utilizing mediation in an attempt to reach a timely and ami-
cable property settlement would be well advised to file a divorce petition
prior to finalizing the MSA to ensure the MSA is binding.
IV. ACCEPTANCE-OF-BENEFITS
A. KRAMER V. KASTLEMAN
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court revisited applica-
tion of the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine to property division appeals
for the first time since the 1950 Carle decision.34 This equitable doctrine
prohibits a party who has accepted the benefits of a judgment from subse-
quently challenging that judgment. The supreme court granted review be-
cause of the inconsistent application of the doctrine and the need to
“clarify that the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine is a fact-dependent, es-
toppel-based doctrine focused on preventing unfair prejudice to the op-
posing party.”35 Lisa Kramer and Bryan Kastleman executed a settlement
agreement concerning their child, and a second settlement agreement di-
viding their property. The two agreements purported to settle all issues
and, after both were signed, Kastleman appeared for a prove-up hearing
and testified that the property division was fair and equitable to both he
31. Id. at *47.
32. An underlying issue in this case may have been avoiding unfair delay in the final-
ization of the case. If this issue arose in a county where S.P. v. N.P. is not precedent, ask
the court to set a deadline for arbitration of disputed issues. If the court can set deadlines
for mediation, then it may also be appropriate for the court to set deadlines for arbitration
subsequent to mediation.
33. Highsmith v. Highsmith, No. 07-15-00407-CV, 2017 WL 4341466, at *4–5 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo Sept. 28, 2017, no pet.). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.602(a) (West
2017).
34. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (Tex. 1950).
35. Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 211, 213 (Tex. 2017).
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and Kramer. However, no divorce decree was presented or signed at the
hearing.
Before the final decree was presented to the trial court, Kramer moved
to set aside the property agreement as unfair and inequitable. She argued
that her consent to the agreement was fraudulently procured and pro-
vided evidence that after she entered into it she discovered Kastleman
had forged her signature on financial documents and concealed signifi-
cant assets from her.36 Kastleman responded with a motion to enter judg-
ment. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court signed a final decree,
which was later corrected to incorporate the property settlement agree-
ment and other additional post-judgment motions. Kramer appealed, and
Kastleman moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing Kramer was estopped
from challenging the final decree by acceptance of the judgment’s bene-
fits, specifically, her acceptance of rents for property awarded to her.
Kramer stipulated that she accepted rents, but countered that in the
event of remand for reconsideration of the property division, she could
restore the benefits she accepted, thereby preventing any harm to
Kastleman. The Austin Court of Appeals dismissed Kramer’s appeal for
failure to assert an exception to the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine and
never reached the merits of her fraud claim.
Kramer petitioned the supreme court for review, arguing “dismissal of
an appeal is not appropriate unless a spouse’s acceptance of benefits
under a divorce decree prejudiced the other spouse or the spouse has
otherwise clearly acquiesced in the judgment.”37 Justice Guzman’s opin-
ion sets out the history and development of the doctrine. She then exam-
ines its application and exceptions in the unique context of marriage
dissolution. Acceptance-of-benefits arguments arise in divorce more than
any other context because parties are dividing shared marital interests in
other words, community property. The two threshold inquiries to deter-
mine if a spouse should be estopped from appealing under the accept-
ance-of-benefits doctrine are: (1) whether the other spouse will be
prejudiced because there are no means for the appealing spouse to re-
store the accepted benefits under a different just and right property divi-
sion; and (2) whether the spouse pursuing appeal acquiesced to the
property division. Acceptance and control of property during the pen-
dency of a divorce in and of itself does not signal acquiescence, since both
parties usually hold some jointly owned property during a divorce. Acqui-
escence is a factual inquiry. Justice Guzman reiterates that an equity in-
quiry is necessary before application of estoppel under the acceptance-of-
benefits doctrine.38 Justice Guzman concluded that Kastleman would not
be prejudiced, and that Kramer did not acquiesce to the property divi-
sion, so the court of appeals erred in dismissing Kramer’s appeal on an
36. See Kramer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 574 Fed. App’x 370, 371 (5th Cir. 2014).
37. Kramer, 508 S.W.3d at 216–17.
38. Id. at 232.
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acceptance of benefits theory.39
B. MATTER OF MARRIAGE OF STEGALL
The Amarillo Court of Appeals also considered the acceptance-of-ben-
efits doctrine in In re Stegall.40 Julie Stegall filed an abuse of discretion
appeal of the trial court’s property division for failing to meet the just and
right standard by mischaracterizing cattle as husband Kerry’s separate
property. Kerry Stegall sought to have Julie’s appeal dismissed using an
acceptance-of-benefits argument. In applying the nonexclusive factors set
out in Kramer, Senior Justice Hancock found that Kerry was not disad-
vantaged by Julie’s acceptance of two awards under the property division
that had a cash value of $2,703.32, particularly since there was no claim
that Julie would be unable to restore those funds if she successfully ap-
pealed but received a smaller property distribution.41 Additionally, the
court found that Julie’s consistent challenges to the trial court’s character-
ization of the cattle as separate property counters Kerry’s argument that
Julie acquiesced in the judgment.42 Since Kerry was not prejudiced, and
Julie did not acquiesce, the case was reversed as to the characterization of
property and remanded.43
Both Kramer and Stegall demonstrate the difficulty appellee’s will have
utilizing an acceptance-of-benefits theory to have property division ap-
peals dismissed before a hearing on their merits. The appellant will have
to take actions such as accepting property and then disposing of it to the
extent that the marital estate cannot be made whole in the event of a
successful appeal. This doctrine will only apply to very narrow factual
situations going forward.
V. SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE AND ALIMONY
A. WILLIS V. WILLIS
There were three notable court of appeals decisions addressing spousal
maintenance during the Survey period. The Fourteenth Houston Court of
Appeals reversed an award of spousal maintenance for a full-time mother
of special needs twins on weekly dialysis for renal disease who resided at
her mother’s home with her children.44 Lola Willis testified at trial that
she could meet her minimum monthly expenses of $1,455 a month if she
continued to live with her children at her mother’s home, continued re-
ceiving monthly social security payments for her disability, and received
either $1,000 a month as spousal support or $1,000 a month as part of the
39. Id.
40. 519 S.W.3d 668 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, no pet.).
41. Id. at 673.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 676.
44. Willis v. Willis, 533 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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property division.45 The trial court awarded her $972 a month in spousal
support and $1,000 a month for sixty months under the property division.
The court of appeals found that Lola failed to present sufficient evidence
that she could not meet her minimum reasonable living expenses with her
monthly social security disability income and the monthly payments from
the property division, so the court struck the spousal maintenance
award.46 The result may have been different if Lola included housing ex-
penses in her minimum reasonable living expenses.
B. ALFAYOUMI V. ALZOUBI
Fadi Alfayoumi appealed a Cameron County district court decision
awarding spousal maintenance to Tharwah Alzoubi, his wife of fourteen
years.47 In a memorandum opinion, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision. Alfayoumi argued that Alzoubi grad-
uated from nursing school prior to the marriage and should be able to
meet her minimum reasonable living expenses with a bachelor’s degree.
However, Alzoubi became pregnant before she was licensed and never
worked as a nurse. The court of appeals reasoned that the trial court
could have found Alzoubi’s return to graduate nursing school was neces-
sary for her to make meaningful use of her degree, and that by starting
the graduate program during the pendency of the divorce, she made a
diligent effort to meet her minimum expenses, and thereby overcame the
presumption against spousal maintenance.48
C. ROBERTS V. ROBERTS
The San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed a trial court award of
spousal maintenance, holding that Margaret Roberts failed to present
sufficient evidence that she was unable to earn sufficient income to meet
her minimum reasonable living expenses because of a disability, thereby
failing to meet required factors under Texas Family Code Section 8.051.49
Margaret testified to numerous chronic ailments,50 but her testimony was
not sufficient to rebut the presumption against awarding spousal mainte-
nance because she failed to link her illnesses to her inability to work.51
45. Lola testified that she is able “to provide for herself and her children’s reasonable
needs for living” while she lives rent-free at her mother’s house but that “it’s going to be a
struggle” if that option were not available to her. Id. at 555–56.
46. Id. at 556.
47. Alfayoumi v. Alzoubi, No. 13-15-00094-CV, 2017 WL 929482, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi Mar. 9 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
48. Id. at *1.
49. Roberts v. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051 (West 2006).
50. No physician testified to Margaret’s health problems, nor were any medical
records admitted. However, the trial court could have found Margaret was disabled based
solely on her testimony. See Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001,
pet. denied); Galindo v. Galindo, No. 04-13-00325-CV, 2014 WL 1390474 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio Apr. 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
51. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 234.
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These cases highlight the importance of strictly following the statutory
requirements for Chapter 8 spousal maintenance. To overcome the strong
presumption against spousal maintenance, provide ample evidence of
“minimum reasonable needs” and why a party is unable to meet those
needs. Willis and Roberts presented sympathetic situations but ultimately
failed by not providing sufficient evidence.
D. DALTON V. DALTON
The Texas Supreme Court granted review of Dalton v. Dalton, a post-
judgment enforcement of contractual alimony case out of the Tyler Court
of Appeals.52 While residents of Oklahoma, Bart and Carol Dalton en-
tered into a separation agreement with provisions for spousal support.
The agreement was incorporated into an Order of Separate Maintenance
rendered by the Rogers County Oklahoma District Court on December
18, 2006. The amount and duration exceeds what is permissible for statu-
tory maintenance in the Texas Family Code. In 2008, the parties moved to
Texas and Bart filed for divorce. After proper domestication of the
Oklahoma separate maintenance order, Carol filed a counterpetition and
notice of foreign judgment.53 In 2011, after significant legal wrangling by
the parties, the Nacogdoches County Court at Law entered a final decree.
The decree gave full faith and credit to the Oklahoma separate mainte-
nance order as a final order, and awarded Carol spousal support under
the terms of the order of separate maintenance.54 Almost immediately
upon entry of the decree, Carol initiated enforcement proceedings, alleg-
ing support arrearages and requesting a wage withholding order for child
and spousal support. Carol later filed another petition for a qualified do-
mestic relations order. Bart filed opposing both the wage withholding or-
der and issuance of a qualified domestic relations order. After the trial
court signed a wage withholding order and a Qualified Domestic Rela-
tions Order assigning Carol a portion of Bart’s retirement as payment for
spousal support arrearages and attorney’s fees, Bart appealed. On appeal,
Chief Justice Worthen modified the arrearage amount, but otherwise af-
firmed the trial court ruling.55 Bart petitioned the Texas Supreme Court
for review and it was granted.
The three issues presented are: (1) does giving full faith and credit to a
foreign judgment allow a Texas court to enforce a spousal support obliga-
tion originating from a final out-of-state order via wage withholding, or is
enforcement via wage withholding limited to statutory spousal mainte-
52. Dalton v. Dalton, No. 12-15-00203-CV, 2017 WL 104639 (Tex. App.—Tyler Jan. 11,
2017, pet. granted), rev’d, Dalton v. Dalton, No. 17-0155, 2018 WL 3207133 (Tex. June 29,
2018).
53. See Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 35.003 (West 2015).
54. See In re Marriage of Dalton, 348 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2011, no
pet.).
55. Dalton, 2017 WL 104639, at *4.
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nance awards under Texas Family Code Chapter 856; (2) is it unconstitu-
tional under Texas Family Code Section 8.101 to allow garnishment of
wages for payment of spousal support originating from a final out-of-state
order if the award fails to meet the Texas statutory requirements for court
ordered maintenance; and (3) do Texas Property Code Sections 42.001
and 42.0021 prohibit use of a qualified domestic relations order to divide
an employer retirement plan covered by ERISA,57 if the division is to
satisfy an award of spousal support originating from a final out-of-state
order.58 In other words, can Texas courts use Texas enforcement vehicles
to enforce out-of-state orders beyond the extent it could use those same
vehicles to enforce Texas orders. The Texas Supreme Court heard oral
arguments on Dalton in February of 2018, so these issues should be re-
solved during the next Survey period.
VI. STANDING
A. IN RE H.S. AND IN RE LANKFORD
On September 1, 2017, the Texas Supreme Court granted petition for
review of In re H.S.59 The sole issue in In re H.S. is whether grandparents
have standing under Texas Family Code Section 102.003(a)(9) to file an
original petition for modification.60 In In re H.S., grandparents filed a
petition to modify a prior SAPCR order alleging actual care, custody, and
control of the child for six months prior to their filing.61 Father filed a
plea to jurisdiction. The Tarrant County district court sustained Father’s
plea and grandparents appealed to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. The
trial court’s order was affirmed by the Fort Worth court in July 2016. Su-
preme court review was likely granted because of the split of opinion
from the courts of appeals on the application of Section 102.003(a)(9) as
seen in In re Lankford.62 In that case, the Tyler Court of Appeals arrived
at the opposite conclusion of In re H.S., denying mandamus relief to the
56. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.001–8.305 (West 2017).
57. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056 et seq. (2014).
58. Petition for Review, Dalton v. Dalton, (No. 17-0155) (Tex. 2017), http://www
.search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=17-0155&coa=cossup [https://perma.cc/JNZ4-HX8H];
Response to Petition for Review, Dalton v. Dalton, (No. 17-0155) (Tex. 2017), http://www
.search.txcourts.gov/Case.aspx?cn=17-0155&coa=cossup [https://perma.cc/JNZ4-HX8H].
59. No. 02-15-00303-CV, 2016 WL 4040497 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 28, 2016, pet.
granted) (mem. op.), rev’d, In re H.S., No. 16-0715, 2018 WL 2993873 (Tex. June 15, 2018).
60. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9) (West 2017).
61. Under § 102.003(a)(9), grandparents also had to prove they were not foster par-
ents of the child. The parents agreed that the grandparents were not foster parents, and the
court found that they were not. In re H.S., 2016 WL 4040497, at *4.
62. See In re K.K.C., where the Beaumont Court of Appeals found a non-parent who
did not have authority to make legal decisions for the child did not have standing under
Section 102.003(a)(9). In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, orig.
proceedings). This is one of the cases the Fort Worth court followed to reach their decision
in In re H.S., 2016 WL 4040497, at *3–4. The San Antonio Court of Appeals also followed
the Beaumont court. See In re N.I.V.S., No. 04-14-00108-CV, 2015 WL 1120913 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). There is another line of cases
with contrary holdings, including the Austin Court of Appeals’ Jasek opinion. Jasek v. Tex.
Dep’t of Fam. & Protect. Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.). Four
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father and affirming the trial court’s ruling that the step-mother had
standing to file an original SAPCR petition under Section
102.003(a)(9).63 The Tyler Court of Appeals found the step-mother had
actual care, custody, and control of the child for six months prior to
filing.64
The statutory definition of actual care and control is the crux of the
split of authority. In In re H.S., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals said the
evidence supported the trial court’s finding that parents had not given up
their parental rights of care and control, and therefore the grandparents
could not have actual care and control.65 Justice Walker cautioned that if
a fit parent is exercising their rights, a finding of standing by a non-parent
may run afoul of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Troxel decision.66 In In re
Lankford, the father does not dispute step-mother had care and custody,
but asserts she did not have “legal control.”67 Chief Justice Worthen does
a full analysis of the split opinions interpreting Section 102.003(a)(9). He
finds that the statute need not require a parent to abdicate their rights,
and that a non-parent asserting standing under the statute does not have
ultimate authority to make legal decisions for the child.68 He also finds
that allowing standing under Section 102.003(a)(9) in a modification mat-
ter does not offend the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Troxel because
Texas courts do not apply the parental presumption in modification
cases.69
The Texas Supreme Court heard oral arguments on In re H.S. in Janu-
ary 2018, so the split will be resolved this year. If the supreme court con-
tinues its trend to strictly interpret statutes as written, the In re Lankford
holding would appear to have the edge. However, the possible Troxel
implications, where a fit parent allows a non-parent to have daily care of
a child for six months and risks losing custody as a result, should not be
overlooked. As the Jasek court said, “[U]nlike the statute in Troxel, Sec-
tion 102.003(a)(9) does not violate a parent’s right to make decisions re-
garding their children; rather, it imposes potential legal consequences for
certain types of parental decisions.”70
other courts of appeals have applied Jasek, in memorandum opinions. See In re Lankford,
501 S.W.3d 681, 687 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.).
63. In re Lankford, 501 S.W.3d at 681.
64. It was not disputed that the step-mother was not a foster parent. Id. at 684–85.
65. The argument that shared custody by parents and grandparents could convey
standing was also rejected. In re H.S., 2016 WL 4040497, at *5.
66. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
67. In re Lankford, 501 S.W.3d at 685.
68. Id. at 690–91.
69. Id. at 689. Both In re H.S. and In re Lankford are modifications. Several of the
cases these opinions rely on are initial SAPCR suits. Perhaps the Texas Supreme Court will
clarify how Troxel applies in initial suits as opposed to modification matters.
70. Jasek, 348 S.W.3d at 536.
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VII. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
A. IN RE REARDON
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals joined the Dallas Court of Appeals
and First Houston Court of Appeals’ holding that a trial court may hear a
modification matter while an appeal of a prior final trial court order is
pending.71 In In re Reardon, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals denied
Rico Reardon’s petition for writ of prohibition.72 Father’s petition hinged
on whether a previous El Paso Court of Appeals case, In re E.W.N.
(Nichol Appeal II), was precedent for his case.73 Tracing the history of In
re E.W.N. is necessary to understand the Reardon decision. In 2012, In re
E.W.N. (Nichol Appeal I), an appeal from a Denton trial court, was
transferred from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals to the Amarillo Court
of Appeals per a docket control order.74 While Nichol Appeal I was
pending, Father filed another petition to modify in the Denton trial court.
The trial court dismissed Mr. Nichol’s second petition on the basis that
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction over the mat-
ter. Nichol appealed (Nichol Appeal II). Per a second docket control or-
der, Nichol Appeal II was transferred from Fort Worth to the El Paso
Court of Appeals. The sole issue in Nichol Appeal II was whether a new
petition to modify can be taken up by a trial court while an appeal of a
previous final SAPCR order is pending. The El Paso Court of Appeals
declined to follow previous decisions from its sister courts and affirmed
the trial court ruling dismissing the second petition on the basis that the
court of appeals had exclusive jurisdiction.75
Relying on Nichol Appeal II as precedent, Rico Reardon appealed a
Tarrant County trial court decision rendered while an appeal of a previ-
ous final SAPCR order was pending. Reardon argued that the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals, the transferor court under the docket control order in
Nichol Appeal II, was bound by the El Paso Court of Appeals Nichol
Appeal II decision because the El Paso Court of Appeals was the trans-
feree court in Nichol Appeal II. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held
that neither the Rules of Appellate Procedure nor stare decisis mandate
that a transferor court of appeals follow decisions from a transferee court
on a matter of first impression.76 As such, the El Paso opinion was not
precedent for Fort Worth. After determining Nichol Appeal II was not
precedent, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed the three non-prec-
71. See Hudson v. Markum, 931 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, writ denied);
Blank v. Nuszen, No. 01-13-01061-CV, 2015 WL 4747022 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Aug. 11, 2015, no pet.).
72. In re Reardon, 514 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, orig.
proceeding).
73. In re E.W.N., 482 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.).
74. Nichol v. Nichol, No. 07-12-00035-CV, 2014 WL 199652 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
75. In re E.W.N., 482 S.W.3d at157.
76. In re Reardon, 514 S.W.3d at 923; TEX. R. APP. PROC. 41.3.
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edential opinions from its sister courts.77 Reardon championed the El
Paso Court of Appeals holding that the interplay between Texas Family
Code Sections 109.001 and 109.002 prohibited a trial court from hearing a
modification request during the pendency of an appeal.78 Section 109.001
dictates that once an appeal is perfected, temporary orders “to preserve
and protect the safety and welfare of the child during the pendency of an
appeal,” must be rendered by the trial court within thirty days.79 Section
109.002 governs appeals of final SAPCR orders in family law matters.80
Reardon argued that allowing a trial court to modify a previous order
while an appeal of that order is pending, but after expiration of the thirty
day deadline set by Section 109.001, renders the deadline meaningless.81
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals disagreed and declined to follow In re
E.W.N.82
The court then considered the reasoning from Blank v. Nuszen, a 2015
First Houston Court of Appeals case.83 Mother, Miriam Blank, appealed
trial court’s 2013 final SAPCR order appointing Father sole managing
conservator. During the pendency of the appeal, Father filed an emer-
gency petition to modify, and on April 23, 2015, the trial court signed a
default order again naming Father sole managing conservator. Mother
filed a timely motion for new trial, but did not appeal the April 23, 2015
default order. In May 2015, the First Houston Court of Appeals notified
the parties that Mother’s appeal of the 2013 order would be dismissed as
moot unless she could show that there was a live controversy the court of
appeals could consider. Mother could not make that showing. Mother’s
appeal of the 2013 order was moot because Father’s emergency petition
to modify was an original proceeding, in effect a new lawsuit, and the
resulting April 2015 default order replaced the previous 2013 final or-
der.84 The court of appeals said the trial court retained jurisdiction to
hear Father’s 2015 modification matter and properly rendered a new final
order.85
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals then reviewed the Dallas Court of
77. It is worth reading both Justice Sudderth’s opinion in Reardon and Justice Mc-
Clure’s opinion in Nichol Appeal II. In re E.W.N., 482 S.W.3d at 150. This issue seems ripe
for the Texas Supreme Court to exercise its conflict jurisdiction under Texas Government
Code Section 22.001(a)(2) and settle the split opinions from the courts of appeals. TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.001(a)(2) (West 2017).
78. Reardon, 514 S.W.3d at 927.
79. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.001 (West 2017).
80. Appeals shall be undertaken “as in civil cases generally under the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002 (West 2017). An appeal does not
automatically suspend the final order, but the order may be suspended either by the trial
court or by the appellate court if a relator makes a “proper showing” for relief. Id.
§ 109.002.
81. Id.
82. See Reardon, 514 S.W.3d at 923.
83. Blank v. Nuszen, No. 01-13-01061-CV, 2015 WL 4747022 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Aug. 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem.op.).
84. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.004 (West 2017).
85. Blank, 2015 WL 4747022, at *2.
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Appeals opinion in Hudson v. Markum.86 In Hudson, the Dallas Court of
Appeals overruled a trial court ruling dismissing a modification case dur-
ing pendency of an appeal of an original SAPCR order.87 The Dallas
court found that the trial court retained continuing jurisdiction under the
family code because the modification was an original proceeding.88 In
Reardon, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals followed the Blank and Hud-
son decisions, and found that a petition for modification is an original
proceeding that should be heard by a trial court, even when an appeal to
a previous final order is pending.89 As long as the courts of appeals are
split, practitioners in jurisdictions that have not addressed this issue
should read the full Reardon and In re E.W.N. opinions to determine
their best argument and anticipate opposing party’s approach.
B. FUENTES V. ZAROGOZA
The First Houston Court of Appeals considered another thirty-day
statutory deadline in Fuentes v. Zaragoza, a case from the Harris County
245th District Court.90 On March 18, 2016, Miguel Fuentes appealed the
parties’ final decree of divorce and Evangelina Zaragoza made a timely
request under Texas Family Code Section 6.709 for temporary orders.91
Section 6.709(a) sets a thirty-day deadline from the date an appeal is per-
fected for a trial court to issue temporary orders to preserve property and
protect the parties.92 On April 1, 2016, the trial court issued orders
awarding Evangelina temporary support and attorney’s fees. Miguel filed
a writ of mandamus. On August 9, 2016, the court of appeals condition-
ally granted writ and directed the trial court to vacate the April orders,
hold another hearing, and enter new temporary orders. Miguel moved for
rehearing, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct another
hearing because the thirty-day deadline had passed. On October 6, 2016,
the court of appeals denied rehearing, withdrew the August ruling and
issued a substitute opinion directing the trial court to modify its April 1
order. In November 2016, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and
the trial judge verbally pronounced orders modifying support and, for the
first time, appointed a receiver to oversee the community estate. The trial
court signed the new temporary orders on November 23, 2016, and Mi-
86. 931 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, writ denied).
87. Hudson, 931 S.W.2d at 337.
88. Id. The Hudson court relied on Texas Family Code Section 155.001(a), formerly
Texas Family Code Section 11.05, to find continued, exclusive jurisdiction was retained by
the trial court. Id. It dismissed application of Texas Family Code Section 109.001, formerly
Texas Family Code Section 11.11(e), as inapplicable since the modification was not a re-
quest for temporary orders but rather an original proceeding. Id.
89. Reardon, 514 S.W.3d at 930. Father presented interesting, albeit unsuccessful, ar-
guments about mootness, evasion of appellate review and increased litigation costs through
repeated modification filings. Id. at 927–29.
90. Fuentes v. Zaragoza, 534 S.W.3d 658 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no
pet.).
91. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.709 (West 2017).
92. See id. § 6.709(a).
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guel subsequently filed the notice of appeal of the appointment of
receiver.
Ultimately, Miguel’s interlocutory appeal challenges the trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to monitor the commu-
nity estate during the pendency of his appeal of the decree because the
temporary orders appointing the receiver were issued well after the April
17, 2016 deadline for the trial court to render temporary orders. The
court of appeals agreed with Miguel’s argument that the trial court’s ple-
nary power to issue new relief in temporary orders during the pendency
of his decree appeal expired on April 17, 2016.93 Justice Bland found the
appointment of the receiver void because the November 2016 trial court
order was the first order appointing a receiver and that order was ren-
dered after the thirty-day deadline expired.94 Since the receiver appoint-
ment was new relief that was not timely rendered, the trial court was
directed to vacate the receivership order.95
C. IN RE J.R.P.
Several courts of appeals reviewed the pleadings and evidence required
to change the parent with exclusive right to designate primary residence
of the child in temporary orders during the pendency of a modification
case. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed a 300th District
Court of Brazoria County case that switched the parent with the right to
designate the primary residence of the child.96 A.M. is the mother and
J.P. is the father of J.R.P. In December 2013, an order on suit affecting
the parent child relationship designating Mother as the parent with the
exclusive right to designate J.R.P.’s residence was entered. Less than six
months later, Father filed an affidavit and petition to modify.97 Since the
petition was filed less than one year after the rendition of the order, the
pleadings must meet the requirements of Texas Family Code Section
156.102.98 Section 156.102 requires that the petition to change the parent
with exclusive right to designate a child’s residence on temporary orders
be accompanied by an affidavit containing relevant facts and alleging that
the child’s physical health or emotional development will be impaired if
93. Fuentes, 534 S.W.3d at 663.
94. Id. at 665.
95. On the same day Miguel filed the notice of appeal of appointment of receiver
discussed above, he also filed a petition for writ of mandamus for review of the support
and attorney’s fees award. See In re Fuentes, No. 01-16-00951-CV, 2017 WL 3184760 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) The First Houston Court of
Appeals conditionally granted the writ. Id. at *9. In the memorandum opinion, Justice
Bland found that the trial court retained jurisdiction to render the November modification
of the support and attorney’s fees initial ordered in April under Texas Family Code Section
6.709(b). Id. at *8. Section 6.709(j) reads, “The trial court retains jurisdiction to modify and
enforce a temporary order under this section unless the appellate court, on a proper show-
ing, supersedes the trial court’s order.”
96. See In re J.R.P., 526 S.W.3d 770, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no
pet.).
97. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.102 (West 2017).
98. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.102 (West 2017).
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the child is not removed from their current home.99 Father filed an affida-
vit with his petition and alleged that Mother may be using drugs while
J.R.P. is in her care and that if she is, J.R.P.’s health and emotional devel-
opment are endangered. Mother filed a motion to dismiss Father’s peti-
tion, alleging his affidavit was deficient.
At a June temporary orders hearing, the trial judge found that the affi-
davit was insufficient but did not dismiss the case and, instead, ordered
Mother to submit to drug testing.100 Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine and marijuana. After Mother failed the drug test, Fa-
ther amended his petition and affidavit to allege that Mother was using
drugs while J.R.P. was in her care, and that her drug usage was endanger-
ing the child’s physical and emotional development. The positive drug
test results were incorporated into the affidavit. In August, the trial court
signed temporary orders giving Father exclusive right to designate
J.R.P.’s primary residence, and providing for supervised visitation for
Mother. On May 27, 2015, the parties bench trial began.101 In August, the
trial court entered a final modification order preserving joint conservator-
ship of the parties, but giving Father the exclusive right to determine the
child’s residence. Mother appealed the final modification order asserting
the petition to modify should have been dismissed due to an insufficient
affidavit and because the trial evidence did not prove a material and sub-
stantial change.
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision.102 Justice Donovan held the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion by denying Mother’s motion to dismiss despite finding Father’s initial
affidavit defective, as the statute does not compel dismissal.103 Further,
Father filed an amended affidavit that supported the finding of significant
impairment before the second temporary orders hearing that led to the
switch to Father as conservator who determines residence. The court of
appeals also found the trial evidence supported a finding of material and
substantial change of the parties and modification of the conservator who
designates residence as a result of the change because Mother failed drug
tests and admitted to the court she was abusing drugs.104
99. Id.
100. An interesting question is whether the court could have ordered the drug test
based on an insufficient affidavit, but this question is moot in the present case because the
Mother agreed to the drug test.
101. The trial was held on three non-consecutive days. Father was represented by coun-
sel all three days. Mother was pro se for the first two days but retained counsel for the final
day of trial.
102. In re J.R.P., 526 S.W.3d at 781.
103. Id. at 778. Section 156.102(c) provides, “the court shall deny the relief sought and
refuse to schedule a hearing for modification under this section unless the court deter-
mines, on the basis of the affidavit, that facts adequate to support an allegation listed in
Subsection (b) are stated in the affidavit.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.102(c) (West
2017). Why does denying the relief sought not equal dismissal? See In re A.S.M., 172
S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
104. In re J.R.P., 526 S.W.3d at 779. Mother argued that circumstances had not changed
because she was a drug user before the prior order, but Father testified that she had passed
a drug test before the prior order and that he thought she was no longer abusing drugs. Id.
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In a Dallas Court of Appeals case, Darla Eddins’ request for writ of
mandamus was conditionally granted and the trial court was directed to
vacate temporary SAPCR orders and reinstate the final decree within ten
days or writ would issue.105 Darla and Mark Eddins divorced on Novem-
ber 5, 2015, and Darla was appointed conservator with the exclusive right
to designate the children’s residence. In March 2016, Mark filed a motion
for modification but did not request modification of the right to establish
the primary residence. Two temporary order hearings were held in late
October. After the first temporary orders hearing, the judge issued verbal
orders prompting Mark to file an amended petition and affidavit. After
the second hearing, the trial judge issued written temporary orders.
Under both orders, Mark was appointed sole managing conservator with
exclusive right to designate the children’s residence. The court of appeals
found the trial judge’s verbal temporary orders void.106 The court then
examined the sufficiency of Mark’s amended pleadings under Texas Fam-
ily Code Section 156.006(b)(1).107 Under the statute, a trial court first
reviews the affidavit in support of modification to determine if a hearing
is necessary. If the affidavit sets out facts that support an allegation that
changing the party with the exclusive right to designate primary residence
is warranted on temporary orders because “the child’s present circum-
stances would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional
development,” then a hearing should be set.108 However, in Eddins, the
hearing was set before Mark filed his amended petition and initial affida-
vit, so it was not set on the basis of the affidavit. Despite the lack of an
affidavit, the court concluded that if the evidence from the hearing sup-
105. In re Eddins, No. 05-16-01451-CV, 2017 WL 2443138 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jun. 5,
2017, pet. denied).
106. Id. at *5. At a hearing on October 24, 2016, the trial judge issued verbal temporary
orders giving Mark sole managing conservatorship and exclusive right to designate the
children’s residence. Mark had not pled for a change of conservatorship or exclusive rights
prior to the hearing, so Darla did not have notice that conservatorship was at issue at the
hearing. The court of appeals found the verbal temporary orders void because of the im-
proper notice and award of relief not requested. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001
(West 2017). Mark may have been able to overcome these issues if he argued in his subse-
quent pleadings that there was an emergency need for the court to take immediate action
and change custody, since a party may be permitted to correct notice and pleading defects
retroactively after emergency orders are rendered. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(b)
(West 2017).
107. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.006 (West 2017). The parties signed a MSA for their
divorce in June 2015. Mark filed his petition for modification on March 11, 2016, less than
one year after signing the MSA. Moreover, Section 156.102 would have applied if Mark
requested switching the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the children’s
primary residence from Darla to him. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.102 (West 2017). How-
ever, his original petition did not request that change. His first request for change in con-
servatorship and exclusive right to designate was pled in his amended petition with
attached affidavit that was filed on October 25, 2016. The court ruled out applicability of
Section 156.102 for motions filed within year of execution of a MSA, explaining that the
date of the amended pleading controls as the amended petition first requested the change
of the exclusive right to designate and amended pleadings supersede prior ones. Eddins,
2017 WL 2443138, at *5.
108. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.006(b)(1) (West 2017).
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ports the significant impairment allegation whether the hearing should
have been held is immaterial.109 Although the trial judge found signifi-
cant impairment due to Darla’s efforts to alienate the children from
Mark, the court of appeals disagreed and ruled that the trial judge abused
her discretion when she switched the parent with exclusive right to desig-
nate primary residence of the children to Mark after the second tempo-
rary orders hearing.110
J.R.P. and Eddins demonstrate the high threshold necessary to change
primary conservatorship on temporary orders. Courts continue to strug-
gle with the affidavit and pleading requirements needed to obtain a hear-
ing under Section 156.102. Affidavit requirements designed to limit
modification filings seem to be doing little to stem the continuation of
litigation.
E. IN RE MCPEAK
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals followed a 2014 Dallas
Court of Appeals memorandum opinion when it conditionally granted
mandamus of the Brazoria County District Court case, In re McPeak.111
Mother, Amy McPeak, challenged the trial court’s denial of her motion
for modification of temporary orders and request for the court to confer
with her 13 year-old child. The trial court relied on Texas Family Code
Section 156.102 in dismissing Mother’s motion because no affidavit was
attached to the motion.112 The court of appeals explained that Section
156.102 does not apply to motions to modify temporary orders, so the
trial judge abused his discretion when he denied Mother’s motion.113 The
court of appeals additionally found that the trial judge must confer with
the 13-year-old child.114
109. Eddins, 2017 WL 2443138, at *5 (citing In re Barkley, 2009 WL 2431499, at *1
(Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 10, 2009, orig. proceeding)).
110. Id. at *6. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the relationship between the
parties is dysfunctional, but did not find that the environment impaired the children. Id.
Justice Evans discusses the high bar a party must reach to meet the significant impairment
standard and reviewed a line of cases where allegations of parental alienation did not rise
to the level of significantly impairing the child’s physical health or emotional development.
Id. If allegations of parental alienation arise, it may be best to have a mental health profes-
sional testify about the impact on the child to prove impairment.
111. 525 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding). See In re
Casanova, No. 05-14-01166-CV, 2014 WL 6486127 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 20, 2014, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
112. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.102 (West 2017).
113. McPeak, 525 S.W.3d at 315–16; Section 105.001 is applicable for modification of
temporary orders. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001 (West 2017).
114. McPeak, 525 S.W.3d at 316. Texas Family Code § 153.009(a) dictates that upon
application by a parent a trial judge shall confer with children twelve years or older regard-
ing the child’s preference on which parent should establish their residence. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 153.009(a) (West 2017).
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Lastly, a 2017 case provided a trap for the unwary that practitioners
will need to know. The Dallas Court of Appeals found that a trial court’s
memorandum ruling issued after a jury trial was a final judgment and
dismissed Mother’s appeal.115 The Collin County District Court signed a
memorandum ruling on February 22, 2017.116 Mother filed a motion to
suspend judgment pending appeal five days later, and a motion for new
trial on March 27, 2017. The trial court signed a final SAPCR order, pre-
sumably presented by Father, on March 30, 2017. Mother filed a notice of
appeal. The court of appeals deemed the memorandum opinion a final
order, holding it “substantially complie[d] with the requisites of a formal
judgment” and rejecting Mother’s argument that it failed as a final order
under Section 105.006.117 Section 105.006 mandates that final SAPCR or-
ders contain specific information about the parents and mandatory statu-
tory warnings. In the present case, neither were included in the
memorandum opinion.118 The memorandum opinion also did not have
provisions for health insurance or medical support for the child, did not
set a start date for child support, did not address if child support would be
paid through the state disbursement unit, and the only right or duty of the
conservators given was Father’s exclusive right to designate residence.
Nevertheless, using the February 22, 2017 memorandum ruling as the
start date for the post-trial deadlines, the court of appeals deemed
Mother’s motion for new trial as untimely.119 Subsequently, Mother’s ap-
peal failed for want of jurisdiction.120
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the Survey period, significant cases dealt with application of
Obergefell to rights for same-sex couples beyond marriage, the impor-
tance of precision when drafting MSAs, and the difficulty of applying the
acceptance-of-benefits doctrine to property division appeals. Noted Texas
trends included increased review of trial courts’ authority to hear matters
when an appeal is pending, and clarification of pleading requirements to
modify orders rendered less than a year earlier. Opinions from the Texas
Supreme Court during 2018 will provide clarification on multiple fronts
where a split of authority exists.
115. In re B.D., No. 05-17-00674-CV, 2017 WL 3765848, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug.
31, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
116. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.006.
117. In re B.D., 2017 WL 3765848, at *2.
118. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 105.006(d)–(e2).
119. In re B.D., 2017 WL 3765848, at *2. An appeal must be filed within thirty days of a
final order, unless the deadline is extended by post-judgment orders. Mother’s motion for
new trial was filed thirty-three days after the memorandum ruling. Therefore, it was filed
after the trial court’s plenary power expired.
120. While the authors disagree with this opinion, practitioners would be wise to file
plenary extending motions within thirty days of memorandum rulings. Hopefully subse-
quent opinions will limit this case’s reach.
